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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This article reviews Texas conflicts cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2003
through November 31, 2004. The article excludes cases involving federal-
state conflicts; intrastate issues such as subject matter jurisdiction and
venue; and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subse-
quent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state law topic, except for a few con-
stitutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in
state and federal courts.' The Survey period saw continued growth in
forum contests, a record number of choice of law decisions, and a static
number of judgment enforcements. The Texas Supreme Court offered
significant opinions on (1) child custody jurisdiction, finding continuing
Texas jurisdiction where the children had not lived in Texas for five
years;2 (2) forum selection clauses, approving-in a case of first impres-
sion- a mandamus remedy for a trial court's refusal to honor a choice of
forum clause;3 and (3) class actions, clarifying the requirement of a choice
of law analysis in certifying multistate class actions.
4
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice of law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
2. See In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 2004), discussed infra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text.
3. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004), discussed infra notes 116-18
and accompanying text.
4. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004), discussed
infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on contract's forum selection
clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects
of notice are purely matters of forum law, this article will focus primarily
on the issues relating to amenability.
A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum selection clause designating
either the optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over
the defendant. When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction. Only valid prorogation
clauses establish personal jurisdiction, and they are discussed in this sec-
tion. Derogation clauses are discussed below as a grounds for the forum
to decline otherwise valid jurisdiction. 5
The Survey period produced only one unreported case considering a
forum clause designating Texas; enforcement of the clause was denied.
Texas-based Toro Marketing LLC bought certain assets from Meshwerks,
a Utah corporation partly owned by Utah resident Kevin Scheidle.6 As
part of this transaction, Scheidle accepted membership in Toro and signed
agreements containing choice of law clauses designating Dallas County,
Texas as proper venue. 7 Toro later determined that Meshwerks' assets
had been exaggerated and requested for more information. Scheidle did
not respond and Toro sued him in a Texas state court; Scheidle filed a
special appearance and removed the case to federal court.8 The court
found Scheidle's contact with Texas insufficient to support personal juris-
diction and specifically found the forum selection clause inapplicable be-
cause Meshwerks had sold the assets in question, and the agreements
signed by Scheidle concerned membership in Toro, which was not at is-
sue9. The court also noted that forum clauses do not create jurisdiction
per se and are merely considered as part of the totality of contacts. 10
5. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 360-61 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter SCOLES & HAY]; James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
899, 912-41 (1999) [hereinafter Parallel Litigation] For a discussion of forum derogation
clauses, see notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
6. Toro Mktg., LLC v. Scheidle, No. 3:03-CV-611-R, 2004 WL 330701 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
20, 2004).
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *2-4.
10. Id. at *4 (citing Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1195 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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B. NONRESIDENTS' FORUM CONTACTS
Texas uses "limits-of-due-process" long-arm statutes, meaning that the
minimum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal juris-
diction in Texas.1 1 The Texas long-arms also apply in Texas federal courts
except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute for a very
few federal claims. 12 In spite of due process's dominance, these personal
jurisdiction cases are grouped under the long-arm categories.
1. The Texas Long Arm in Commercial Cases
Commercial cases in Texas state courts during the Survey period dealt
with confidentiality agreements, the fiduciary shield doctrine, and general
jurisdiction based on sometimes tenuous connections.
The Fifth District Court of Appeals considered two lawsuits seeking to
enforce confidentiality agreements. Interestingly, the court denied juris-
diction over the Michigan-based employee of a Texas company and found
jurisdiction for the transnational enforcement of a confidentiality agree-
ment signed in Tennessee, and it reversed the trial court in both cases. In
the first case, Texas-based Provider HealthNet Services ("PHNS") ac-
quired employees from Detroit Medical Center ("DMC") in a plan for
DMC to outsource its services to outside employers. 13 These new em-
ployees signed confidentiality agreements with PHNS; the documents
were sent from Dallas but were negotiated and signed in Detroit. PHNS
fired one employee-Paul Gustafson-after seven months for poor job
performance, and Gustafson immediately returned to work for DMC.
PHNS sued Gustafson in a Dallas court, alleging that he was sharing
PHNS's confidential information with its customer, DMC.14 The trial
court found jurisdiction over Gustafson, but the court of appeals reversed
based on the lack of pertinent events occurring in Texas.
15
In the second case, Texas-based Delta Brands sued Rautaruukki Steel,
a Finnish steel manufacturer, to enjoin it from revealing trade secrets ac-
quired during meetings with Delta.16 Rautaruukki wished to construct a
new mill that would produce steel with less residual stress and met with
11. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long arm statutes are found at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045
(Vernon 1997). Others are scattered throughout Texas statutes. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIC.
CODE ANN. § 161.132 (Vernon 2004) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 6.305 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004) (nonresident respondents in divorce ac-
tions); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 823.457 (Vernon 2004) (violations of duties imposed on
insurance holding companies).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (state long-arms in federal court); FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(1)(D) (federal long arm statutes). Examples of federal long-arm statutes include 28
U.S.C.A. § 2361 (West 1994) for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West 1997
& Supp. 2004) for claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
13. Gustafson v. Provider Healthnet Servs., Inc., 118 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 484-85.




Delta to learn about its in-line temper mill. Rautaruukki first visited
Delta's Memphis plant where they signed a confidentiality agreement
before learning of the process and then visited Delta's headquarters in
Irving, Texas, where they had access to detailed technical drawings and
specifications. 17 In the following months, Rautaruukki sent numerous e-
ails seeking additional information but ultimately told Delta they would
not buy Delta's mill. Delta then learned that Rautaruukki was negotiat-
ing with a European manufacturer for a similar mill; Delta sued in Dallas
to enforce the confidentiality agreement. 18 The trial court sustained
Rautaruukki's special appearance, but the Dallas Court of Appeals re-
versed, finding ample contacts with Texas regarding the information
gained under the confidentiality agreement.1 9
Two court of appeals cases, both concerning oilfield claims, illustrated
the fiduciary-shield doctrine with opposite but consistent results. In
Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff failed to show that a nonresident shareholder was
the alter ego of his corporation regarding its oil and gas operations in
Texas; the court relied on the fiduciary-shield doctrine to protect the
same shareholder from jurisdiction arising from his activities in Texas on
behalf of his corporation.20 The fiduciary shield failed to protect a Swiss
citizen from specific jurisdiction for his corporate activities regarding
oilfield testing equipment, because, as the court explained, the doctrine
protects corporate officers and directors from claims based on general
jurisdiction but does not apply to claims based on specific jurisdiction.21
This reasoning-that the fiduciary shield works only in general jurisdic-
tion cases where the corporate agent's forum contacts are unrelated to
the claim-was the basis for its denial in two additional specific jurisdic-
tion cases (one involving nonresident lawyers claiming the shield). 22
Three other cases split on nonresident officer's liability, with the first eas-
ily finding specific jurisdiction over nonresident members of a Texas lim-
ited liability company for misappropriate funds.23 The second reversed
the trial court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a Mississippi of-
ficer for his corporation's failure to pay rent for a West Texas radio oper-
17. Id. at 509.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 511-12.
20. Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 12-13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, pet. denied).
21. A.C.S. Wright v. Sage Eng'g, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238, 250-51 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st dist.] 2004, pet. denied). See also Carone, 138 S.W.3d at 12.
22. Jackson v. Kincaid, 122 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
granted, judgm't vacated & remanded by agr.) (lawyers from Oklahoma firm representing
companies in Texas bankruptcy); Stern v. Kei Consultants, Ltd., 123 S.W.3d 482, 488-92
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (subjecting the president and vice president of
Canadian pulp mill to specific jurisdiction).




ation.24 The third reversed the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction over a
nonresident embryologist sued in her capacity as a corporate officer of an
animal genetics company.2 5
Bruno's Inc. v. Arty Imports, Inc.2 6 illustrates the difference between
ruling on jurisdiction and ruling on the merits. Dallas-based Arty Im-
ports allegedly lost thousands of dollars when its employee, Castaneda,
conspired with a Florida man named Bultron to pilfer Arty's money
through fraudulent purchases and forged endorsements.2 7 Bultron
worked in a Florida store owned by Bruno, an Alabama corporation.
Arty sued Bruno, alleging respondeat superior liability based on Bruno
having authorized Bultron to cash checks. 28 Although vicarious liability
for intentional torts is very difficult to establish, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, plaintiff's allegations are taken as true and must be refuted. De-
fendant failed to refute them and was subject to trial on the merits. 29
Unlike the Bruno decision, another court of appeals missed the distinc-
tion between jurisdictional facts and the merits of the case. Mabry v.
Reid involved a Texas resident's action against a foreign corporation-
Citation Corporation-and its nonresident employee-Reid-regarding
fraudulent statements Reid allegedly made to Mabry about salary and
benefits to be paid to Mabry for his work in Beaumont. 30 The trial court
granted Reid's special appearance and the court of appeals affirmed,
finding that the jurisdictional allegations were based on Reid's alleged
fraudulent statements and that the trial court had "made an implied find-
ing that no such representation was made. '31 A dissent correctly pointed
out that this finding went to the merits of the case and was inappropriate
for a jurisdictional dismissal. 32
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed trial court findings of juris-
diction in two cases involving foreign business operations with mostly for-
eign parties and only tenuous Texas connections. In Moni Pulo Ltd. v.
Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc., the court of appeals agreed that Texas lacked ju-
risdiction over Moni Pulo, a Nigerian corporation, in an action by another
Nigerian corporation regarding the development of an oil field in Nige-
24. Dowdy v. Miller, 122 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.). The court
also rejected the Mississippi officer's non-compete agreement as a basis for Texas jurisdic-
tion, as well as statutory duties imposed on officers of foreign corporations. Id. at 821-22(citing TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon 2003)).
25. Morris v. Powell, 150 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
Plaintiffs' additional arguments of alter ego and general jurisdiction also failed. Id. at 219-
23. The court of appeals upheld the finding of jurisdiction over a second defendant, a veter-
inarian, based on his direct contacts with Texas related to the medical negligence claim. Id.
at 223.
26. 119 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
27. Id. at 895.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 899-900.
30. Mabry v. Reid, 130 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
31. Id. at 389-90.
32. Id. at 390-91 (Burgess, J., dissenting).
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ria.33 Plaintiff based its Texas jurisdiction argument on the defendant's
joint venture partner, another Nigerian company with a Houston-based
parent corporation. The court found this connection too remote,34 as it
did plaintiff's argument regarding the contested proceeds flowing through
a Texas bank,35 defendant's having contracted with Texas drillers,36 and
other unrelated Texas contacts.37 Similarly, in Alenzia Spazio, S.P.A. v.
Reid, the same Houston Court of Appeals found no jurisdiction-either
specific or general-over two Italian corporations regarding a proposed
joint venture to commercialize Russian geosynchronous orbital slots for
its communications satellites.38 The court rejected several bases for juris-
diction, including one defendant's signed contract with a Texas corpora-
tion owned by one of the Russian parties, where the contract designated
Texas law as controlling. The court disagreed with plaintiff's argument
that this contract amounted to purposeful availment of Texas law and
emphatically pointed out that, in any event, a choice-of-law clause was
not consent to Texas jurisdiction.39
The Fifth District Court of Appeals reached the opposite result in a
similar case involving a Texas party but concerning a foreign-based dis-
pute with little or no connection to Texas. Siemens AG v. Houston Casu-
alty Co. was an action filed in a Houston state court regarding a power
plant failure in Mexico. 40 The defendant was a German manufacturer of
turbines whose failure allegedly caused the plant to shut down. The
Texas plaintiff, joining plaintiffs from Mexico, was a Houston reinsurer
who had to pay the Mexican power company's damages.41 Despite the
Texas party's presence, the German defendant had no ties to Texas re-
lated to this action; plaintiffs asserted general jurisdiction based on Sie-
mens's general contact with Texas unrelated to this claim arising in
Mexico. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of jurisdic-
tion, basing the decision on defendant's failure to refute bases for general
jurisdiction.42 Defendant refuted only specific jurisdiction.43
In other commercial cases, Texas state courts upheld specific jurisdic-
tion (1) over an Ohio corporation which failed to pay for materials it
purchased through the South Carolina office of a Dallas-based company
but with knowledge that the materials were shipped from Dallas;44 (2)
33. Moni Pulo Ltd. v. Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
34. Id. at 175-77.
35. Id. at 174-75 (as a specific jurisdiction argument); see also id. at 177-78 (as a gen-
eral jurisdiction argument).
36. Id. at 178.
37. Id. at 179-80.
38. 130 S.W.3d 201, 206-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. filed).
39. Id. at 219.
40. 127 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. struck).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 440-42.
43. Id. at 441.
44. N. Coast Commercial Roofing Sys., Inc. v. Rmax, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 491 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
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over a Canadian defendant who was a reinsurance intermediary regard-
ing claims arising in Texas and insured initially by a Texas insurer;45 (3)
for deceptive trade practice and warranty claims against a nonresident
seller of a motor home; 46 (4) over Alabama boat owners for breaching an
agreement to provide boating services on the Gulf of Mexico to person-
nel and guests from an Austin-based company, where the initial agree-
ment was made in Pensacola and none of the services were performed in
Texas; 47 and (5) over nonresident insurers for a class action regarding
unpaid claims.48 Alter ego failed as a basis for jurisdiction in a Dallas
commercial-property case that offered little in the way of new law or
novel facts but illustrated the high standards necessary to prove jurisdic-
tion based on alter ego.4 9
Federal courts applying the Texas long-arm statutes found neither gen-
eral nor specific jurisdiction in (1) an action involving the troubled
WorldCom, relating to a defaulted commercial property lease in Tennes-
see;50 and (2) an unpaid salary claim for a job as president of a South
Dakota company, to be performed in South Dakota, where plaintiff was a
Washington resident at the time she signed the contract but later moved
to Texas. 51
2. The Texas Long-Arm in Non-Commercial Tort Cases
In Bridgestone Corp. v. Lopez, 52 the court of appeals used the single-
enterprise theory to establish personal jurisdiction over Japan-based
Bridgestone, linked to a finding of general jurisdiction over Bridgestone's
American counterpart, Firestone North American Tire, L.L.C. The claim
arose from a single-car accident in Mexico in 2000, allegedly caused by
defective Firestone tires that were manufactured and sold in Mexico.53
Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's finding of gen-
eral jurisdiction, and most of its appellate argument centered on Bridge-
stone's lack of general jurisdiction in Texas courts for this accident in
Mexico. The court of appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court had
not addressed the single-enterprise theory but cited its application in sev-
45. Dion Durrell & Assoc., Inc. v. S.J. Camp & Co., 138 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2004, no pet. h.).
46. Michiana Easy Livin' Country Inc. v. Holten, 127 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. granted).
47. Holk v. USA Managed Care Org., Inc., 149 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004,
no pet. h.).
48. Commonwealth Gen. Corp. v. York, 141 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2004, pet. filed).
49. Le Meridien Hotels & Resorts v. LaSalle Hotel Operating P'ship, 141 S.W.3d 870
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
50. WorkPlaceUSA, Inc. v. Palmer Plaza Partners, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-0019, 2004
WL 2058780 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2004).
51. Sommer v. Compass, Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-1719-B, 2004 WL 859202
(N.D. Tex. 2004).
52. 131 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. granted, judgm't vacated &
remanded by agr.).
53. Id. at 676.
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eral Texas courts of appeal and further noted its distinction from alter ego
theory, which requires fraud. 54 The single-enterprise theory resembles
partnership concepts with five elements: (1) the use of common person-
nel, (2) the use of common facilities, (3) the use of centralized accounting
and an unclear allocation of profits and losses, (4) the payment of wages
and rendition of services by one corporation for the other, and (5) the use
of a common business name. The court found that all elements existed
between Bridgestone and Firestone 55 and affirmed the trial court's find-
ing of general jurisdiction over Bridgestone. 56
In two related Houston cases, courts of appeal rejected jurisdiction for
asbestosis claims against a nonresident corporation that was the alleged
successor of M.W. Kellogg Company; one opinion found insufficient evi-
dence of corporate succession, 57 and the second held that the new com-
pany's agreement to indemnify a third company for Kellogg's liabilities
was not a basis for Texas jurisdiction. 58 In a similar but more straightfor-
ward case, a Texas court of appeals upheld specific jurisdiction over a
Delaware/Kentucky insurer for claims of nonpayment against a Texas in-
surer that had just been purchased by the nonresident insurer.59
In State of Rio De Janeiro of the Federal Republic of Brazil v. Philip
Morris, Inc., the Beaumont Court of Appeals conducted a thorough anal-
ysis of minimum contacts' second prong-the fair play and substantial
justice test-and denied general jurisdiction over several tobacco compa-
nies, none located in Texas, for public health claims by a Brazilian attor-
ney general.60 Interestingly, the defendant tobacco companies conceded
their continuous and systematic contacts with Texas in return for plain-
tiff's concession that it was arguing only general jurisdiction.61 These
stipulations thus established the contacts prong for general jurisdiction
and placed all the eggs for both parties in the outcome of the fair play and
substantial justice test. The defendants won the omelet. In particular, the
court noted Texas's lack of any interest in litigating Brazilian public
health claims against nonresident companies for claims arising entirely
outside of Texas, as well as the lack of any relevant evidence.
62
In other cases, Texas state courts (1) denied specific jurisdiction over
the American Dental Association as an additional party in a medical mal-
practice claim, where plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction based on the associa-
54. Id. at 682 (citing N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied)).
55. Id. at 682-86.
56. Id. at 686-87.
57. Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Howard, 130 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
58. Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Purseley, 127 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
59. Commonwealth Gen. Corp. v. York, 141 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2003, pet. filed).
60. 143 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
61. Id. at 500.
62. Id. at 502-03.
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tion's endorsement of amalgam fillings that, in this case, were used in a
pregnant patient, allegedly resulting in birth defects; 63 (2) denied specific
jurisdiction over a Michigan doctor and hospital for services rendered
there to a Detroit Tigers baseball player who lives in Texas;64 (3) upheld
specific jurisdiction over a New York based company for slamming a
Texas company, that is, for improper switching of telephone long distance
services; 65 and (4) in reviewing the effects of a post-accident corporate
relocation, denied specific jurisdiction but upheld general jurisdiction
over an out-of-state insurer that had been located in Houston at the time
of a Texas resident's death at a job site in Kentucky. 66
3. Long-Arm Statutes in Federal Question Cases
Federal courts ordinarily use the long-arm statute of the state in which
they sit but use a federal long-arm statute in a few instances.
a. Texas Contacts-Federal Question Cases Applying the Texas
Long-Arm
Most claims arising under federal law lack an accompanying federal
long-arm statute and are limited to the forum state's jurisdictional reach.
Because Texas extends its long-arm to the full reach of due process, fed-
eral question defendants are amenable if they satisfy any of the Texas
long-arms. Federal courts decided four noteworthy Texas personal juris-
diction cases regarding intellectual property during the Survey period.
The most interesting case is Isbell v. DM Records, Inc.,67 which thor-
oughly explored the jurisdictional bases for copyright claims. DM
Records is a Florida corporation whose agents traveled to Texas in 1999
to buy assets from Isbell Records, which was in bankruptcy in Sherman,
Texas. DM purchased certain assets from the bankruptcy trustee and
thereafter began marketing music acquired from the purchase, including
the songs "Whoomp There It Is!" and "Dazzey Duks." Alvertis Isbell, a
individual who was president of the now-bankrupt Isbell Records, dis-
puted DM's copyright on those songs; he claimed that the bankrupt com-
pany owned only the sound recordings and not the copyrights, and he
sued in a Dallas federal court for copyright infringement and other
relief.68
63. Botter v. Am. Dental Assoc., 124 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
64. Brocail v. Anderson, 132 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
denied). The court recited the test for personal jurisdiction in "out-of-state doctor" cases,
noting that medical services rendered outside the forum were not likely to meet the "pur-
posely directed" element of minimum contacts. Id. at 559-60.
65. Kytel Int'l Group, Inc. v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2004, no pet. h.).
66. Equitable Prod. Co. v. Canales-Trevino, 136 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, pet. denied).
67. Isbell v. DM Records, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:02-CV-1408-A, 2004 WL 1243153 (N.D.
Tex. June 4, 2004).
68. Id. at *1-2.
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DM's objections to both subject matter (not discussed here) and per-
sonal jurisdiction were denied after a thorough analysis. The court first
found that DM had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protec-
tions of Texas law by traveling here and contracting to buy the bankrupt
estate's assets, which would have sufficed as the contacts portion of the
minimum contacts test.69 Second, the court found a stream-of-commerce
basis, that is, that DM created a contact with Texas by placing the songs
"into the stream of commerce with the knowledge and expectation that
those compositions would reach the Texas market. ' 70 Stream of com-
merce is traditionally used for products liability cases; the court noted
that although they were not binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit, 71 a
sufficient number of opinions broached the subject, leading the district
court in the instant case to conclude that "copyright infringement activity
might, in certain circumstances, satisfy the stream of commerce test for
minimum contacts."' 72 Third, the court held that DM's acts of alleged
tortious infringement of a Texas resident's copyrights satisfied the effects
test as highlighted in defamation cases and used in various Fifth Circuit
precedents. 73 These three bases-purposeful availment, stream of com-
merce, and tortious effects-satisfied only the contacts prong. The court
then did an exhaustive analysis of the fair play and substantial justice
balancing test and found that the Florida defendant was not unduly in-
convenienced by litigating in Texas. The court did, however, issue a sua
sponte ruling to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas in Sher-
man based on the presence of evidence there and the bankruptcy court's
familiarity with the issues.74
The second of the four intellectual property cases was Delta Brands,
Inc. v. Danieli Corp., which is similar to Delta's state-court claim of trade
secret expropriation against the Finnish company Rautaruukki Steel.
75
In this case Texas-based Delta sued Swedish steel manufacturer SSAB
Turnplat and Delta's Italian competitor Danieli corporation for SSAB's
alleged sharing of Delta's manufacturing processes with Danieli, acquired
when SSAB representatives visited Delta's Texas operation. Delta sued
them in federal court in Texas, and despite SSAB's visit here, the court
found the defendants lacked sufficient contacts with Texas to warrant ju-
69. Id. at *6-7.
70. Id. at *8-9.
71. Id. at *9 (citing Nuovo Pignone, Spa v. Storman Asia MA', 310 F.3d 374, 381 (5th
Cir. 2002) (noting the court's reluctance to extend stream-of-commerce principles outside
of products liability)).
72. Id. (citing Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1993); Alpine
View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000)). The court further noted
stream of commerce's weak plurality status in the Supreme Court. Id. at *8 (citing Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). The court also noted its
valid status in the Fifth Circuit. See Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9
F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at *10 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (defamation); Realsongs v.
Gulf Broad. Corp., 824 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. La. 1993)).
74. Id. at *13 (relying on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 2004)).
75. 99 Fed. Appx. 1, 2004 WL 960040 (5th Cir. 2004). See supra notes 16-19.
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risdiction. 76 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no personal jurisdiction as
to SSAB and Danieli & C (the Italian defendant) 77 and granting a forum
non conveniens dismissal to Danieli Corporation (the American
defendant). 78
The third case, Nations AG II, LLC v. Hide Co., LLC,79 involved two
plaintiff corporations from Tennessee and Washington state suing a Mis-
sissippi corporation for trade-secret misappropriation related to the mar-
keting of agricultural pesticides. Plaintiffs entered into sales agreements
with The Hide Company in which certain technical information was nec-
essarily disclosed and, according to plaintiffs, then shared with third par-
ties. Plaintiffs sued The Hide Corporation and two of its sales agents,
John Jordan and Larry Barefoot. Defendants' objections to personal ju-
risdiction failed, with Jordan's and Barefoot's sales calls to Texas binding
both the company and them individually, over their fiduciary shield
defense. 80
The fourth intellectual property case is Vishy Dale Electronics, Inc. v.
KOA Corp.,81 involving parallel lawsuits in federal courts in Texas and
Pennsylvania for patent infringement. The Texas case was filed first and
defendants KOA and KOA Speer Electronics moved to dismiss or alter-
natively transfer to the federal court in Pennsylvania where they had filed
a mirror-image action. Noting that plaintiffs need allege nothing more in
most patent infringement cases than the sale of the infringing product in
the forum, the court found jurisdiction in Texas. 82 The court denied de-
fendants' motion to transfer and issued an anti-suit injunction against de-
fendants' Pennsylvania case as to two of the six patents at issue.83
Moving away from intellectual property, Elliot v. Firearms Training
Systems, Inc. echoes the Bruno case, discussed above, in its distinction
between jurisdiction and the merits. 84 Elliot brought an Americans with
Disabilities Act claim against his employer, Georgia-based Firearms
Training Systems, alleging injury for not allowing Elliot to fly first class on
trips between Texas and Georgia. The federal district court found gen-
eral jurisdiction based on plaintiff's unrefuted allegations of their ongoing
Texas business contacts, 85 but it nonetheless dismissed his claim based on
federal statutory language requiring filing in Georgia.86 Because this fil-
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. at *4-8.
78. Id. at *8-10.
79. Nations AG II, LLC v. Hide Co., LLC, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-0511-K, 2004 WL
1496312 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2004).
80. Id. at *4.
81. Vishy Dale Elecs., Inc. v. KOA Corp., No. 4:04-CV-247-A, 2004 WL 1908244 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 24, 2004).
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *4.
84. Elliot v. Firearms Training Sys., Inc., No. 5A-04-CA-0490-RF, 2004 WL 2567619
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2004); see Bruno discussion supra notes 26-29.
85. Elliot, 2004 WL 2567619, at *2-3.
86. Id. at *4-5 (citing cases interpreting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (West 2004)).
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ing requirement appeared in the applicable federal substantive law, it was
a dismissal on the merits rather than on jurisdiction.
b. Nationwide contacts-federal question cases applying a federal
long-arm
Rule 4(k)(1) allows for a nationwide-contacts analysis for enumerated
cases and 4(k)(2) for foreign defendants not otherwise subject to the ju-
risdictional reach of any one state. In cases applying these rules, suffi-
cient contacts are assessed with the United States as a whole rather than
any one state.87 In one of the more unusual cases in any category during
the Survey period, a San Antonio federal court found no jurisdiction
under the Texas long-arm as to two defendants but held over the case to
allow for service under a federal long-arm. Nocando Mem Holdings, Ltd.
v. Credit Commercial de France, S.A., involved a RICO claim regarding a
Cayman Islands investment company named InverWorld that went bank-
rupt in 1999.88 Its owner, Jose Zollino, was a Mexican national who
moved to San Antonio where he established InverWorld and related
companies for offshore transactions. When the operation went bankrupt,
investors sued a number of allegedly related defendants in a San Antonio
federal court. Four defendants objected to personal jurisdiction-Credit
Commercial de France (a French bank), Finely, S.A. (a French company),
HSBC Private Banking, Ltd. (a Bahamian bank), and Handelsfinanz-
CCF Bank (a Swiss bank).89 In a lengthy opinion, the court found spe-
cific jurisdiction over the first two, CCF and Finely, based on Texas con-
tacts, and no jurisdiction over the third and fourth defendants under the
Texas long-arm under which they were served. However, the court found
that the third and fourth defendants were subject to the RICO long-arm
with nationwide service of process and ordered that the claims against
them be retained until service was made. 90 Finally, because of the diffi-
cult issues in the case, the court recommended that the parties seek a
certified interlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional issues.91
Congress also enacted more specific long-arms, as illustrated by In re
L.D. Brinkman Holdings, Inc.92 In 2003, Texas-based Brinkman filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in Dallas. And pursuant to that bank-
ruptcy, it filed a claim against California-based Anderco to collect for the
sale of vinyl flooring.93 Anderco maintained its headquarters and sole
business site in Los Angeles and purchased the flooring through Brink-
man's facilities in California. Although the purchase was made through
an independent agent in Atlanta, Georgia, all other buyer-seller activities
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
88. Nocando Mem Holdings, Ltd. v. Credit Commercial de France, S.A., No. Civ. A.
SA-01-1194-XR, 2004 WL 2603739 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2004).
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id. at *39.
91. Id. at *39 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2004)).
92. 310 B.R. 686 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
93. Id. at 687.
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occurred in California. 94 Anderco objected to the Dallas bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction and filed an affidavit establishing its lack of any con-
tact with Texas. 95 The bankruptcy court noted the irrelevance of this ar-
gument in light of the federal long arm in Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d),
authorizing nationwide service of process based on contacts with the
United States.96
4. Internet Jurisdiction
Three cases decided during the Survey period considered internet argu-
ments as a basis for personal jurisdiction in Texas. WorldPost Tech., Inc.
v. Universal Express, Inc. was a trademark infringement action arising
from defendant's internet contacts with Texas. 97 The plaintiff, WorldPost,
was in the telecommunications business and the defendant, Universal Ex-
press, was in the private postal business. Universal Express, through sub-
sidiaries and fictitious names, began using variations of the Worldpost
name on websites that successfully solicited Texas business and offered
free network membership through the completion of an on-line form
available on their website. The court found that these activities created
sufficient contacts between Texas, the divisions or subsidiary companies,
and the controversy to support specific personal jurisdiction. 98
In Machinery Marketing, Inc. v. Breaux Machine Works, Inc., a court
exercised specific jurisdiction over a company that used a passive website
(through which direct transactions were not possible) to make the initial
contact with Texas residents regarding the sale of office machines.99 The
opposite result occurred in LCW Automotive Corp. v. Restivo Enterprises,
where the court applied the Zippo sliding scale to reject jurisdiction
based on a passive website that was merely an advertising site. 100
5. Status Jurisdiction
Status jurisdiction is a special category recognizing a state's authority
to adjudicate issues such as marital status, parental custody and mental
competence. It is often characterized as subject matter jurisdiction but
turns on amenability factors such as contacts with the forum state. Com-
petence determinations do not often implicate interstate issues, and mari-
tal status litigation tends to tolerate parallel suits in different states and
countries. The pervasive problem exists with child custody determina-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 689.
97. WorldPost Tech., Inc. v. Universal Express, Inc., No. Civ. A. SA-03-CAO764XR,
2003 WL 22852839 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2003).
98. Id. at *5.
99. Machinery Mktg., Inc. v. Breaux Machine Works, Inc., No. 01-03-00881-CV, 2004
WL 1403571 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 24, 2004, no pet. h.).
100. LCW Auto. Corp. v. Restivo Enters., No. SA-04-CA-0361-XR, 2004 WL 2203440(W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2004) (citing Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (in adopting the well-recognized standards for internet jurisdiction first stated inZippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997))).
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tions-both original and modifications-where conflicting judgments and
parental abduction create problems. The solution has been legislation in
the form of uniform acts or treaties designed to choose a single custody
forum that other states will respect. Domestically, the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") 101 and the fed-
eral Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act ("PKPA") 10 2 seek to establish
unitary child custody jurisdiction and apply full faith and credit to those
decisions. Internationally, the UCCJEA governs both jurisdictional dis-
putes and decree enforcement 10 3 and is joined by the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act104 ("ICARA")-the United States version of
the Hague Convention on Child Abduction' 05-which seeks the return of
children taken both within the United States and across international
borders in violation of valid custody orders. These Acts often involve
judgment enforcement and preclusion but are discussed here because
they also involve questions of status jurisdiction.
a. Interstate custody disputes
Four cases decided during the Survey period involved interstate cus-
tody and related disputes. In re Forlenza10 6 found exclusive continuing
jurisdiction over children who resided out of state for more than five
years. Ann Marie and Robert Forlenza divorced in Collin County in
1996. In July 1997, the Texas court entered an agreed custody modifica-
tion order granting Robert primary custody of the couple's two children
and giving him the exclusive right to establish their primary physical resi-
dence. During the same month, the children moved with Robert to
Washington state. Over the next five years Robert moved the children
three more times. Ann Marie filed suit in 2001, claiming she was having
difficulty exercising her possession rights and seeking a modification of
the 1997 order. Robert challenged Texas's continuing jurisdiction, but
the trial court denied his motion to dismiss. The court of appeals re-
versed and ordered dismissal, and the Texas Supreme Court granted Ann
Marie's petition for writ of mandamus. 10 7
In reversing the court of appeals and affirming the trial court's exercise
of jurisdiction to modify custody, the Texas Supreme Court provided a
brief but insightful history of the UCCJEA, the UCCJA, and the PKPA.
It explained that Article 2 of the UCCJEA specifically grants exclusive
continuing custody jurisdiction to the state that made the initial custody
determination and provides rules on the continuation of that jurisdic-
101. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.101-152.317 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
102. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
103. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105 (Vernon 2002). The PKPA does not apply to
child custody conflicts with foreign countries.
104. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601-11610 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
105. Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, opened for signature on Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 19
I.L.M. 1501-15 (1980) (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983).
106. 140 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 2004).
107. Id. at 374-75.
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tion. 108 Texas adopted Article 2 without substantial variation in Family
Code sections 152.201-210. Robert challenged the trial court's interpreta-
tion of section 152.202(a), which governs the duration of the decree-
granting state's exclusive jurisdiction. That section provides in part that
Texas retains jurisdiction until a Texas court determines that the child no
longer has a significant connection to the state. The trial court had found
a significant connection between the children and Texas based on visits
here and the personal relationships maintained here. The supreme court
agreed and found that those connections, coupled with the children's al-
most continual change of residence, supported continuing jurisdiction in
Texas. l0 9
In other cases, Texas courts (1) exercised jurisdiction over a child with
significant ties with both Texas and New York; 110 (2) exercised jurisdic-
tion over a child who resided in Tennessee for eleven continuous months
prior to commencement of a custody proceeding; 1 ' and (3) declined ju-
risdiction over a Nevada court's initial custody determination because of
the unjustifiable conduct of a mother whose parental rights had been ter-
minated by Nevada and who subsequently interfered with custody. 112
b. International custody disputes
The Survey period produced one notable international custody dispute,
In re Lewin," 3 involving the interplay between a Hague Convention or-
der and the Texas UCCJEA and illustrating once again the regrettable
legal complications inherent in cross-border custody disputes. Brenda
Lewin and Robert Farnsworth, who never married, had a daughter in
1998 in New Jersey. The couple moved to Milam County, Texas in 2000,
but in 2002, Brenda returned to New Jersey with the child. Shortly after
her return to New Jersey, Robert took the child to Texas where he filed a
suit affecting the parent-child relationship (a "SAPCR") and sought cus-
tody. In October 2002, Brenda filed her answer and counter-petitioned
for custody. On November 5, 2002, the Texas district court entered an
order granting joint managing conservatorship and giving Brenda exclu-
sive right to determine the child's primary residence.' 1 4
108. Id.
109. But see In re K.B.A., B.W.A., and D.J.A., 145 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth2004, no pet. h.). Where the court incorrectly cites Forlenza as direct support for retainingjurisdiction merely because one parent still resides in Texas. Id. at 689.
110. In re L.E., No. 07-02-0417-CV, 2004 WL 62712 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 14, 2004,
pet. denied).
111. In re Powell, 121 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. filed). The court
also found jurisdiction over the child's younger bother who was born in Texas after his
parents were separated. The dissenting opinion suggested that rather than stretching the
facts and finding that the older child's absence from Texas was temporary, the Texas court
should have communicated with the Tennessee court and asked it to agree to a consolida-
tion of the custody issues. Id. at 848-49 (Gaultney, J., dissenting).
112. In re S.L.P., 123 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
113. 149 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. App.- Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
114. Id. at 731.
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Brenda and Robert followed the Texas custody schedule for seven
months until July 5, 2003, when Robert again took the child from Brenda
in New Jersey and fled to Montreal, Quebec, where he sued to modify the
Texas custody. Because Robert had wrongfully retained the child,
Brenda filed a Hague Convention application in the Montreal court seek-
ing the return of her daughter based on the Texas custody order. Robert
objected, arguing that the child had been abused and that Brenda had
acquiesced in Robert's custody. After a three day hearing, the Canadian
court ordered Robert to return the child to Brenda by noon the following
day. 115
Robert again fled with the child, this time back to Milam County where
he filed a motion to modify, alleging Brenda's neglect and abuse, request-
ing the exclusive right to determine the child's residence, and requesting
a temporary order restricting Brenda's visitation to Milam County. Less
than an hour after that motion was filed, the Texas court signed a tempo-
rary order giving Robert custody. That afternoon, Brenda filed a motion
to vacate the temporary order and for a writ of attachment, citing the
Hague Convention order from the Montreal court. 116 Brenda also filed
suit in New Jersey to enforce the Hague Convention order and to obtain
custody of the child. On December 5, 2003, the New Jersey court denied
relief stating, "[j]urisdiction is with the State of Texas until further order
of that court indicating that they are specifically changing same."
1 17
At a December 11, 2003 hearing in Milam County, Brenda argued that
the Hague Convention order was enforceable and that Texas did not have
jurisdiction to modify custody because the Canadian court had deter-
mined in November that Brenda, Robert and their daughter no longer
resided in Texas; this argument was ultimately persuasive to the Texas
court of appeals. Robert argued for Texas residency and that Brenda had
not complied with the original Texas SAPCR order. Robert prevailed
again and won another temporary order confirming him as managing
conservator with the right to determine the child's residence and en-
joining Brenda from visiting with the child outside of Milam County. The
court also denied Brenda's motion for rehearing, and she petitioned for a
writ of mandamus. 118 The Austin Court of Appeals found that the statu-
tory framework of the UCCJEA, as adopted in Chapter 152 of the Texas
Family Code, required the trial court to decline jurisdiction based on
Robert's forum shopping and his wrongful retention and abduction of the
child, and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to enforce the
Hague Convention order issued by the Montreal court. 119
115. Id. at 732.
116. Id. at 733.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 741.
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C. REASONS FOR DECLINING OTHERWISE VALID JURISDICTION
Even where all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases involving a sovereign foreign government, cases contractu-
ally directed at other forums, cases in which convenience mandates an-
other forum, and cases parallel to other litigation.
1. Sovereign Immunity
The Survey period produced one notable sovereign immunity case in
which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the test for a sover-
eign's property being immune from garnishment and reversed a federal
district court's finding that the sovereign's assets were immune. The case
is fully discussed below in the Foreign Judgments section. 120
2. Derogating Forum Selection Clauses
The Consent section above discusses forum selection clauses that estab-
lish local jurisdiction.121 Somewhat different considerations arise when
the plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to the parties' earlier choice in a
forum selection clause. These are known as derogation clauses (in regard
to that forum), and instead of justifying the court's retention of the case,
they require the court to consider declining otherwise valid jurisdiction
over the parties. The Survey period produced two such cases. In a 5-4
split, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in a case of first impression that
mandamus was available as a remedy for a trial court's refusal to honor a
choice of forum clause naming New York as the site for any lawsuits on
liability insurance. 122 Louis Dreyfus Corporation bought $70 million in
pollution liability coverage from AIU Insurance and sought coverage for
a claim against its subsidiary, Louis Dreyfus Natural Gas, for an air-
ground-water pollution lawsuit in Hidalgo County, Texas. Justice Owen
wrote for the majority, finding the clause enforceable and the mandamus
remedy appropriate. 123 Chief Justice Phillips led a four-justice dissent,
attacking derogating forum clauses in general and the mandamus remedy
in particular. 124 In the second case, a federal court honored a forum
clause designating federal courts in the Western District of Oklahoma,
regarding an allegedly defective compost machine. 125
3. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is a common law objec-
tion to jurisdiction that now is also available by statutes such as 28 U.S.C.
120. See infra notes 263-69 (discussing Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361(5th Cir. 2004)).
121. See supra notes 6-10.
122. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004).
123. Id. at 110-11, 121.
124. Id. at 121-24 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
125. Soil Bldg. Sys. v. CMI Terex Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-0210-G, 2004 WL 1283966
(N.D. Tex. June 9, 2004).
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§ 1404 for intra-jurisdictional transfers based on convenience. 126 Because
intra-federal transfers under section 1404 do not implicate conflicts be-
tween states or nations, they are not considered here. This article is lim-
ited to inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common law,
available in state and federal courts in Texas under the same two-part test
requiring movant to show the availability of an adequate alternative fo-
rum and that a balancing of private and public interests favors transfer.
127
The Survey period produced six noteworthy forum non conveniens de-
cisions. As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a forum non con-
veniens dismissal in favor of litigation in Italy for a Texas manufacturer's
claim of trade secret expropriation by a Swiss steel manufacturer and an
Italian company, based on technical information the Swiss company ac-
quired in Dallas and then allegedly revealed in Italy.
128
Easter v. Technetics Management Corp.1 29 applied the statutory bar on
forum non conveniens dismissals against a Texas resident. Dennis Easter
worked for Arkansas-based Technetics on a job assignment in Tupelo,
Mississippi. Easter later took a two month leave of absence and re-
quested that he be allowed to do his work-information services-by re-
mote-access dial-up connection. Technetics refused and soon fired him.
Easter sued in Harris County district court, which granted a forum non
conveniens dismissal to Technetics, presumably for refiling in Arkansas
or Mississippi. 130 The court of appeals reversed, noting that Easter al-
leged his Texas residency, Technetics never refuted it, and that the appli-
cable forum non conveniens statute barred dismissals against a Texas
resident. 131
126. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004) is the federal statutory provision for
inconvenient forum objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law pro-
vides for in-state venue transfers based on convenience under TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (Vernon 2002).
127. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403, 423-24 (5th Cir.
2001). The private factors look to the parties' convenience and include the relative ease of
access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of
unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining their attendance; the possibility of viewing
the premises, if appropriate; and all other practical problems that make the trial easy, ex-
peditious and inexpensive. The public factors look to the court's concerns and the forum
state's interests and include the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion;
the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in having
the trial of a diversity case in a forum familiar with the law that must govern the action; the
avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws problems; and the unfairness of burdening citi-
zens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424. Texas' forum non
conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(k) (Vernon
1997) applies to personal injury and wrongful death claims. Common law forum non con-
veniens, in line with Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, governs all other interstate and international fo-
rum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593,
596 (Tex. 1998).
128. Delta Brands, Inc. v. Danieli Corp., 99 Fed. Appx. 1, 2004 WL 96040 (5th Cir.
2004); see supra notes 75-78.
129. 135 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. granted, judgm't va-
cated & remanded by agr.).
130. Id. at 822-23.
131. Id. at 824-26 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(e) (Vernon 2004)).
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Rodriguez Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 1 3 2 raised an interesting question
regarding the validity of a forum non conveniens dismissal after a loss of
subject matter jurisdiction that would arguably render the dismissal order
moot. In 1995, a federal district court in Houston granted a forum non
conveniens motion in a pesticide exposure case by Costa Rican banana
workers. 13 3 The case had been removed from state court based on a fed-
eral question of sovereign immunity-a defendant company in the case
was owned by Israel although the company's status was disputed. 134 In
2000, the Fifth Circuit affirmed both the defendant's sovereign status
(and thus affirmed jurisdiction for removal) and the forum non con-
veniens dismissal. 135 Then, in 2003, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in a different case that the same defendant did not qualify as a
sovereign entity, thus undermining the Houston federal court's jurisdic-
tion.136 Plaintiffs moved to vacate the forum non conveniens dismissal
and to remand the case to state court. The federal district court denied
their motions and held that its forum non conveniens dismissal would
remain valid after remand to state court. 137
In the other three cases, a federal court granted a forum non con-
veniens dismissal in (1) a child-sex-abuse claim against a defendant who
was convicted on related criminal charges in a Dallas federal court and is
now in federal prison;138 (2) an Australian's injury claim regarding an oil
rig accident in the waters off of the Republic of China;139 and (3) in a
products liability action against Ford for an accident in Venezuela. 140
4. Parallel Litigation
Parallel litigation is difficult to define, sometimes meaning identical
lawsuits with exactly the same parties bringing the same claims, and
sometimes meaning two or more lawsuits that may result in claim preclu-
sion for some or all parties. It occurs both intra- and inter-jurisdictionally
and involves remedies of transfer and consolidation (intra-jurisdictional
only), stay, dismissal, and anti-suit injunction or, in many cases, allowing
both cases to proceed and using the first-to-judgment to preclude the
132. 322 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
133. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
134. Delgado, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 800-801.
135. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
136. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
137. Delgado, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 808-16.
138. Punyee v. Bredimus, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-0893-G, 2004 WL 2511144 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 5, 2004). Among other reasons, the court found that plaintiffs' wish to apply Texas
punitive damages law was not warranted. Id. at *9. To protect the plaintiffs after denying
them a Texas forum, the court made the dismissal conditional on litigation in Thailand and
further required the defendant to make pertinent evidence available to the plaintiffs in
Thailand, both routine in forum non conveniens dismissals. The court then ensured the
remedy by requiring the defendant to agree that "any final judgment rendered by the Thai
courts in this case shall be entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the United
States." Id.
139. Dunsby v. Transocean, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 890 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
140. Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
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other. 14 1 This article discusses only parallel litigation involving at least
one case outside of Texas; it does not consider multiple related actions
where all the courts are located in Texas. The Survey period produced
three parallel litigation rulings, the first resulting in an anti-suit injunction
against second-filed patent litigation in Pennsylvania. 142 The second re-
sulted in a conditional dismissal of a Texas plaintiff's declaratory judg-
ment action to nullify alleged gambling debts in Biloxi, Mississippi in
favor of an identical case in Mississippi state court. 143 The third rejected
a Texas plaintiff's argument that it was a victim of in abstentia litigation in
Pennsylvania. 144
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both in
state and federal courts.145 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the
forum state remains in control. 146 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements. 147
Within the forum state's control of choice-of-law is a hierarchy of
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice of law rules, that is,
statutes directing the application of certain state's laws based on events or
people important to the operation of that specific law.148 Second, in the
141. See generally Parallel Litigation, supra note 20; James P. George, International Par-
allel Litigation-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 499
(2001).
142. Vishy Dale Elecs., Inc. v. KOA Corp., No. 4:04-CV-247-A, 2004 WL 1908244 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 24, 2004), discussed supra at notes 81-83.
143. Phillips v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc.-Biloxi, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-0202B, 2004
WL 2533589 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2004). The dismissal was expressly conditioned on any
failure "to completely resolve the matter" in the parallel Mississippi state court. Id. at *3.
144. AVCO Corp. v. Interstate Southwest, Ltd., 145 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.); see discussion infra at notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
145. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
146. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws creates a presumption against
renvoi except for limited circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 8 (1971). Although commentators defend renvoi's limited use, they acknowledge
its general lack of acceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually
found in statutes directing the use of renvoi. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 20, at 67-72
(especially 68 n. 4); WEINTRAUB, supra note 1 at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105(b), 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 8.106, 9.103 (Vernon 1994 &
Supp. 2004). For federal courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state's control of choice of
law. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 497.
147. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text for a brief description of these con-
stitutional requirements.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(1) cmt. a (1971). See e.g.,
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004)); Owens Corn-
ing v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas wrongful
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choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice-
of-law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates other-
wise. 149 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled in
Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. 150 This Survey article is organized according to
this hierarchy-that is, statutory choice of law, followed by choice-of-law
clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most significant rela-
tionship test. Special issues such as constitutional limitations are dis-
cussed in the following section. This grouping results in a discussion that
mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate
appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of
this mix, readers should of course note that choice of law is a state law
issue and the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Supreme
Court.a15
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
The Survey period produced three cases involving Texas choice-of-law
statutes, with the first case raising an important point regarding parties
waiving their choice-of-law options. As discussed in the Notice and Proof
of Foreign Law section, Vannoy v. Verio, Inc. was a claim for stock op-
tions for which the defendant failed to convey as part of an employment
benefits package. 152 The defendant waited until the day of trial to argue
that Delaware law applied and barred the claim, and the court accord-
ingly tried the case to a jury. On post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the court held that same-day notice was sufficient under
Fifth Circuit precedent. It then considered whether Delaware law would
govern under Texas choice of law rules. The applicable rule was a Texas
statute directing that the law of the state of incorporation govern matters
relating to a foreign corporation's shares. 153 The court deemed the Texas
death statute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive law that are appropri-
ate to the case.").
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) ("Law of the State
Chosen by the Parties" allows contracting parties to choose a governing law, within defined
limits.) As explained infra note 288, Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
150. See infra note 170 for the factors in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6 (1971).
151. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue such as legisla-
tive jurisdiction or full faith and credit, or federal questions such as foreign sovereign im-
munity. See e.g., Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (foreign
sovereign immunity) (discussed infra at notes 263-69 and accompanying text); Compaq
Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004) (legislative jurisdiction) (discussed
infra at notes 195-99 and accompanying text); Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor &
Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (full
faith and credit) (discussed infra at notes 234-41 and accompanying text).
152. Vannoy v. Verio, Inc., No. Civ. A. 302-CV-0570K, 2004 WL 1717368 (N.D. Tex.
July 29, 2004).
153. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon 2003), states in pertinent part that
"only the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corporation shall govern (1)
the internal affairs of the foreign corporation, including but not limited to the rights, pow-
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statute on point for plaintiff's claim for stock and then found that Dela-
ware's requirement of a writing and board approval barred this claim
based on an oral agreement.1 54
A Texas insurance statute provides that Texas law governs an insurance
claim, regardless of the parties' agreement, if (1) the insurance proceeds
are payable to a Texas citizen or inhabitant; (2) the policy is issued by an
insurer doing business in Texas; and (3) the policy is issued in the course
of the insurer's business in Texas. 155 Two Survey period cases rejected
this statute's application, one with a ruling of first impression. In Reddy
Ice Corp. v. Travelers Lloyds Insurance Co., a court of appeals affirmed a
trial court's judgment that a Nevada corporation with its principal place
of business in Texas was not a Texas inhabitant for purposes of the first
prong above.156 But the court then found that Texas law governed any-
way under the Second Restatement. 157 Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Na-
tional Emergency Services, Inc.158 was an action for breach of contract
and related claims for insurer's cancellation of malpractice policies for
independent contractors who staffed hospital emergency rooms. The
court rejected the application of a Texas statute regarding choice of law
for the insuring of Texas property or interests because the proceeds in
this case were not payable to Texas residents. 159
B. CHOICE-OF-LAw CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement (Second) permit contracting parties to
choose a governing law, 160 this was reflected in six Survey period cases.
In Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara,161 the Fifth Circuit Couft of Appeals determined
which law governed a Swiss arbitration award that was subsequently
ruled invalid by an Indonesian court. The Fifth Circuit upheld the federal
district court's rejection of the Indonesian court order, finding that the
Indonesian court improperly applied Indonesian law to nullify the award.
The arbitration agreement designated Geneva as the forum but had also
chosen Indonesian law to govern. The Fifth Circuit interpreted the agree-
ment (as had the arbitral tribunal) to mean that Indonesian law would
govern the substance and Swiss law would govern procedural issues. Be-
cause procedural issues such as selection of the panel were the basis for
ers, and duties of its board of directors and shareholders and matters relating to its shares
154. Vannoy, 2004 WL 1717368, at *5.
155. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
156. 145 S.W.3d 337, 340-44 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
157. Id. at 344-46. The court applied the Second Restatement's section 6 (the most
significant relationship test) and section 188(2) (governing contracts with no choice of law
clause).
158. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Emergency Servs., No. 01-02-00929-CV, 2004 WL
1688540 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2004, pet. denied).
159. Id. at *5-6 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981)).
160. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
161. 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004).
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the award's nullification in the Indonesian court, the Fifth Circuit rejected
that opinion and affirmed the district court's enforcement. 162
Rmax, Inc. v. Sarnafil, Inc. is an illustration of disputed fact issues that
precluded a choice-of-law decision. 163 Plaintiff Rmax is a Texas corpora-
tion that sold roofing insulation to Sarnafil, a Massachusetts corporation,
over a twenty year relationship. But Sarnafil was unhappy with Rmax
materials used in a Michigan job and informed Rmax that it would with-
hold payment until the problems were resolved. Rmax sued for payment,
then moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of entitlement to
attorney's fees under Texas law based on choice-of-law clauses in the par-
ties' agreement.164 The court declined to rule on the motion because it
could not determine whether the choice-of-law clause was an integral
part of the agreement. The opinion illustrated the argument for a valid
choic-of-law agreement where the parties dealt in various documents for
repeated purchases over the years, some designating Texas law and some
not, with Rmax's eventual notification to Sarnafil of its intention that all
the parties' agreements were subject to Texas law, and Sarnafil then ob-
jecting to Texas law controlling. In a lengthy analysis, the court noted
that several states had a more significant relationship than Texas did to
the parties' dealings and that whether Texas law would apply depended
entirely on the effectiveness of the Texas choice-of-law clause. The par-
ties' dealings, communications and actions were sufficiently ambiguous so
the court denied the motion, allowing choice of law to await a trial-based
fact finding.165
In other cases, Texas courts (1) honored the parties' choice of Mexican
law in an intellectual property licensing agreement, finding further that
the choice bore a reasonable relationship to the contract and that Mexi-
can law did not violate any fundamental policies of Texas; 166 (2) honored
the parties' choice of Illinois law in a bankruptcy trustee's claim to estab-
lish a partnership with an insurer;167 (3) honored the parties' choice of
Massachusetts law in an employment contract for the issue of prejudg-
ment interest; 168 and (4) reversed a trial court's judgment in an employ-
ment case where it applied California law (where plaintiff performed the
contract) instead of Texas law as chosen in the parties' agreement. 169
Cases rejecting choice of law clauses included an arbitration defendant
unsuccessfully arguing that the parties' choice of Texas law precluded the
162. Id. at 281, 288-94. See also infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
163. Rmax, Inc. v. Sarnafil, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-1404-B, 2004 WL 2070967 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 16, 2004).
164. Id. at *1-3.
165. Id. at *3-6.
166. El Polio Loco, S.A. de C.V., v. El Polio Loco, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Tex.
2004) (citing Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1990)).
167. In re Senior Living Props., L.L.C., 309 B.R. 223, 233 (N.D. Tex. 2004); see infra
notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
168. Smith v. EMC Corp., No. Civ. A. 302-CV-0862M, 2003 WL 22846404 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2003).
169. Mary Kay, Inc. v. Woolf, 146 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
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application of the Federal Arbitration Act;170 and a defendant's unsuc-
cessful argument that its contract with a Texas company had an implicit
choice of California law.
171
C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice
of law clause, Texas courts apply the most significant relationship test
from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 172 The Survey pe-
riod produced three noteworthy cases applying the test.
1. Contract Cases
Tilford v. McGraw Hill Cos. is an example of sua sponte choice of law,
that is, an analysis conducted on the court's own motion. 173 Tilford was a
California resident who filed a pro se lawsuit for a denied promotion. No
choice of law had been raised in the case, but the defendant had premised
its summary judgment motion on Texas law and the pro se plaintiff had
not responded. The case had both Texas and California contacts. The
court conducted a precise analysis under the Restatement (Second) and
ruled that Texas law would apply, clarifying that Texas law was not so
much the only choice for this unbriefed ruling, but that it was not mani-
festly unjust to apply Texas law.174
In two cases involving lawsuit indemnification, Texas federal courts
ruled that Texas law governed because of excessive Texas contacts and
because the underlying lawsuits were both litigated in Texas.
175
170. Dewey v. Wegner, 138 S.W.3d 591, 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no
pet. h.).
171. AMS Staff Leasing v. Starving Students, Inc., No. 3-03-CV-0383-BD, 2004 WL
251819, *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2004). The court noted that a "contract provision that
'merely refers to a particular state without providing any elaboration as to what should
happen in the event of litigation does not serve to delineate the named state as the choice-
of-law forum."' Id. at *3 (citing McLaughlin v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 224 F. Supp.
2d 283, 289-90 (D. Me. 2002)).
172. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: (a) the needs of the
interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the determi-
nation of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority,
which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant rela-
tionship test includes the other choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement
(Second).
173. Tilford v. McGraw Hill Cos., No. Civ. A. 303-CV-07298, 2004 WL 2168369 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 28, 2004); see also J & D Aircraft Sales, LLC v. Cont'l Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 3:03-
CV-0007-B, 2004 WL 2389445 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (air crash insurance claim in which the
same judge took care to make a record on the applicable law where the parties were some-
what equivocal).
174. Tilford, 2004 WL 2168369, at *3.
175. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 2d
652, 659-61 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Executive Risk Indem., Inc. v. Integral Equity, L.P., No. Civ.




In Mayo v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed a judgment involving Texas's insurable interest doctrine;
the case was discussed in the 2002 Survey.176 Mayo was an action by a
employee's widow against Wal-Mart, seeking the proceeds of his life in-
surance policy that Wal-Mart took out with itself as beneficiary. 177 This
practice is illegal in Texas, but Wal-Mart sought to bypass Texas law by
having the policies governed by Georgia law. 178 The trial court rejected
the policy's choice-of-law clause and applied Texas law. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed this, deeming the issue not one of contract, but of tort akin to
conversion. The tort characterization posed an additional problem for
plaintiffs, however, with a two-year statute of limitations now applicable
instead of the four years for contract claims. Here, too, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that Wal-Mart failed to produce evi-
dence of the time it received the insurance proceeds, thus failing in its
affirmative defense. 179
In two other cases, Texas courts-both federal-applied Texas law (1)
to fraud claims by a Texas investment-information company against a
New York marketing company;180 and (2) applied Texas law to a tortious
interference claim in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, with the court
pointing out that while the contractual choice of Utah law would govern a
contract claim, this tortious interference claim was determined by the
most-significant-relationship test. 81 In an unreported case, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's application of Louisi-
ana law to an employee's suit for injuries received in a car accident in
Egypt. 182
3. Class Action Certifications
Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. v. Posey was an interlocutory ap-
peal of class certification in an action by manufactured home buyers
against a Tennessee mortgage lender.' 83 The Poseys, residents of Fannin
County, bought their manufactured home at a Denison dealership, sign-
ing a contract that contained a Texas choice-of-law clause1 4 The Poseys
176. 354 F.3d 400, 406-09 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F.
Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002); James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 56
SMU L. REV. 1283, 1324-26 (2003).
177. Mayo, 354 F.3d at 402-03.
178. Id. at 406 (citing Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Moody, 584 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex.
1979)). As one point on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the insurable interest doctrine's
application to these facts and affirmed its relevance. Id. at 406-09.
179. Id. at 410-11.
180. Insiders Edge, Inc. v. Institutional Research Servs., Inc., No. 3:94-CV-0088-R, 2004
WL 2203246, *9-10 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2004).
181. In re All Trac Transp., Inc., 306 B.R. 859, 909-10 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
182. DeShazo v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 84 Fed. Appx. 407 (5th Cir.
2003).
183. 146 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
184. Id. at 309.
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did not contract with defendant Vanderbilt, rather the mortgage was as-
signed to Vanderbilt after the sale. 185 Vanderbilt began raising the inter-
est rate and according to plaintiffs, made numerous misrepresentations
regarding the plaintiff's obligations. The Poseys sued under the Tennes-
see Consumer Protection Act, and sought to certify a class of Vanderbilt
customers in forty-four states. The trial court certified the class under
Rule 42(b)(4) but refused to certify the class under 42(b)(2).186
The court of appeals reversed because the trial court failed to conduct
a sufficient class certification analysis regarding common questions of law
or fact. Specifically, the court needed to ascertain that the laws of the
forty-four jurisdictions were the same in order to establish a common
question of law for class certification. 187 Plaintiffs had two further argu-
ments. First was that full faith and credit mandated the application of
Tennessee law, an argument quickly rejected by the court. 188 Second was
a false conflicts argument based on an alternative meaning of that term;
the court rejected this as inconsistent with Texas law189 and noted that
even if that view of false conflicts were applied, plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate the consistency of Tennessee interests with the other forty-three
states.190
In other Survey period class action determinations involving choice-of-
law analyses, Texas courts rejected nationwide class certifications because
of a lack of uniform law to be applied in claims involving computer buy-
ers,191 breach of warranty claims by truck buyers, 192 Chrysler car owners
regarding defective seat belts,193 and an eighteen-state class of health in-
surance customers. 194
185. Id.
186. Id. at 310.
187. Id. at 312. Readers should note that the choice of law rule for class certification
differs from ordinary lawsuits in which a presumption exists that the unproven foreign law
is the same as Texas law. Id. This places the burden on the party invoking choice of law to
prove a conflict (here, they had to prove the absence of a conflict); in this case, plaintiffs
sought the application of Tennessee law, which would, in any case, need to be proven.
Nonetheless, in a non-class action, unproven Tennessee law would be presumed the same
as Texas law.
188. Id. at 316-17.
189. Id. at 318-19 (citing James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analyses: Judicial
Misuse of Governmental Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 Rzv.
LIIG. 489, 511 (2004)).
190. Id. at 319.
191. There were two computer-purchaser class actions. See eMachines, Inc. v. Packard,
148 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Alvis,
No. 04-03-369-CV, 2004 WL 1925443 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 31, 2004, no pet. h.).
192. Ford Motor Co. v. Ocanas, 138 S.W.3d 447, 453-54 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2004, no pet. h.).
193. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 121 S.W.3d 862, 885-86 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003, pet. granted). The court of appeals reversed in part for a second choice of law
analysis because the trial court failed to place the burden of demonstrating the absence of
conflicting state laws on the plaintiff. Id.
194. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 131 S.W.3d 576, 592-93, 595 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
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D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
1. Legislative Jurisdiction and Other Constitutional Limits on State
Choice-of-Law Rules
Similar to the due-process limitation on state long-arm statutes, 195 the
United States Constitution imposes limits on a state's ability to choose
the governing law in its courts. Unlike the limits on state long-arm stat-
utes (which arise only under the due process clause), the choice of law
limits arise under several doctrines-due process (requiring a reasonable
connection between the dispute and the governing law), full faith and
credit (requiring the choice-of-law analysis to consider the interests of
other affected states), and to a lesser extent, equal protection, privileges
and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause. 196 Consti-
tutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its own
law in questionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice of forum
law is not the only conceivable constitutional issue, and even when choos-
ing foreign law, courts must apply choice-of-law rules with an eye toward
constitutional limitations.
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray was an interlocutory appeal of
class certification regarding defective floppy disk controllers in personal
computers, with a national class estimated at 1.8 million buyers. 197 The
trial court certified the class, and the court of appeals affirmed without
dissent.198 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and asked for a more rig-
orous analysis of the choice-of-law factor in class certification, specifically
whether the laws of the fifty-plus jurisdictions were sufficiently common.
While other courts analyzing the applicable law for class actions will often
limit the analysis to the commonality requirement-that is, that the
claims must have a common question of law or fact 199-the Texas Su-
preme Court noted the constitutional requirement that forbade the appli-
cation of Texas law to all claims.200 The court remanded the case for a
state-by-state analysis of commonality and reasonable connection to the
claims, and it demonstrated the likely differences with examples from va-
195. See supra notes 11-12.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 9 cmt. (1971). See also
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 5, at 78-109; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648; James P.
George, Choice of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833, 844-46
(1994). Choice of law limits under full faith and credit are now questionable after
Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003).
197. 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004).
198. 79 S.W.3d 779, 784, 794 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002), rev'd 135 S.W.3d 657. This
case is discussed at James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 56 SMU L. REv.
1283, 1336 (2003). The court of appeals upheld the trial court's choice of law analysis
because defendant Compaq failed to demonstrate any conflicts between the states' laws.
This may well be appropriate in cases with fewer parties, but as both the Texas Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court have held, it is inappropriate where it would
result in the application of a state's law to claims not reasonably connected to that state.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985). The instant case does not
cite a Texas precedent prior to this ruling.
199. See e.g., supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
200. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 680 (citing Phillips, 472 U.S. at 821-22).
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rious states' laws on several pertinent issues, including notice of breach,
reliance, and remedies.20 1
2. False Conflicts
A false conflict exists when other potentially-applicable laws are the
same as the forum state's or at least reach the same result.20 2 Defining a
clear outcome-changing difference between the forum and the foreign
law is the first step in conducting a choice-of-law analysis, and the ab-
sence of a clear conflict should result in the application of forum law. 203
The Survey period produced three false conflict cases, and the first one
had the most states involved in a choice-of-law analysis-five-not in-
cluding the class actions.20 4 In re Senior Living Properties, L.L.C., was a
bankruptcy adversary proceeding in which the trustee sued an insurer
seeking partnership indemnification based on surety bonds the insurer
had issued on behalf of the bankrupt.20 5 Senior Living Properties
("SLP") was a limited liability company licensed in Indiana, with its prin-
cipal place of business in Wyoming, but which operated nursing homes in
Illinois and Texas, the greater percentage of homes being in Texas.206
SLP entered into a Reimbursement Agreement with ZC Specialty Insur-
ance Company ("ZC"), a Texas-based insurer, in which ZC agreed to re-
imburse SLP for certain debts and in return received direct payments and
was entitled to share in the profits.207 When SLP filed for bankruptcy, its
trustee pursued ZC for additional debts under a theory of partnership
and argued that Texas law controlled. The bankruptcy court disagreed on
the choice-of-law issue and instead applied the parties' choice of Illinois
law as recited in their agreement, which was negotiated, drafted and exe-
cuted in Maryland. 20 8 Upon closer examination, however, the court
found that a partnership existed under both Illinois and Texas law. 20 9
In two unreported cases, courts found false conflicts in an insurance
claim by a Texas woman who had been living in Oklahoma at the time the
claim manifested, 210 and in a discovery dispute in an asbestos claim where
the court found that both Texas and California laws observed attorney-
201. Id. at 674-81.
202. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971), cmt. i; id. § 186, cmt. c. A very different concept of
false conflicts came from Professor Brainerd Currie's government interest analysis, which
defines a false conflict as one in which only one state has a real interest. See SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 20, at 16-19. Unfortunately, Texas courts have used both definitions, as
discussed in James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 56 SMU L. REV. 1283,
1335 n. 396 (2003).
203. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 823-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
204. See supra note 185 for a discussion of choice of law in class action cases.
205. 309 B.R. 223, 228 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
206. Id. at 233.
207. Id. at 228-29.
208. Id. at 233.
209. Id. at 242, 266-69.
210. Gibson v. Liberty Mut. Group, No. Civ. A. 302-CV-2306D, 2004 WL 942280 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 30, 2004).
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client privilege and the work-product exemption sufficiently similar to
make choice of law irrelevant.
211
3. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister-states' laws. 212 Foreign country law, on the other hand,
must be adequately pleaded and proven.2 13 During the Survey period,
four cases illustrated these points, with the most notable being a Dallas
federal case that explored the lineage for the notice requirement for sis-
ter-state law and permitted day-of-trial notice. In Vannoy v. Verio,
Inc.,21 4 plaintiff argued that Verio's benefits package included 15,000
shares of its stock that Verio failed to convey within the agreed time pe-
riod, and in fact waited until the stock had lost its value. On the first day
of trial, Verio argued that the stock agreement was governed by Dela-
ware law rather than Texas law, which Verio argued would bar the claim.
With this short notice, the court tried the case on the fact issues and the
jury found against plaintiff on part of her claim but it found in her favor
on the 15,000 shares, awarding damages of $195,000.215 Verio then
moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Delaware law
barring the claim. Plaintiff argued that Verio's assertion of Delaware law
only on the first day of trial waived the claim. The federal district court
disagreed and held that the applicability of another state's law need not
be pleaded or proven, but that parties need only give notice "in time to
211. In re Union Carbide, No. 01-02-0153-CV, 2003 WL 22682301 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Nov. 3, 2003, no pet.). The case is discussed infra notes 224-26 and accompa-
nying text.
212. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states' laws
on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must supply
"sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same under
federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S.
218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though FED. R. EVID. 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice) does
not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice mandate for Amer-
ican states' laws is subject to FED. R. EVID. 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters "capa-
ble of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." That is, federal courts may take judicial notice of American
states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely-used unofficial versions,
or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and best evidence.
213. TEX. R. EVID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or sources
offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both the origi-
nal and the English translation. Sources include affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and
any other material source, whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not other-
wise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Federal practice is similar. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 44.1.
214. Vannoy v. Verio, Inc., No. Civ. A. 302-CV-0570K, 2004 WL 1717368 (N.D. Tex.
July 29, 2004).
215. Id. at *1.
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be properly considered. ' 216 Looking to other precedent to determine
whether day-of-trial notice was sufficient, the court found that it was and
applied Delaware law which resulted in defendant Verio's victory. 217
The opposite opinion resulted in three other Survey period cases, based
on a litigant's failure to comply with rules for pleading and proof of for-
eign law and triggering a presumption that the otherwise-applicable for-
eign law is the same as the forum's law. PenWell Corp. v. Ken Associates,
Inc. 218 was an action for breach of contract and related remedies regard-
ing an oral agreement for defendant to be plaintiff's exclusive sales repre-
sentative of exhibition booth space at various conferences and
exhibitions. The letter agreement provided compensation of 20% of the
value of exhibit space sold and a sales territory limited to Japan. The
agreement worked well from 1992 to 1999, after which PennWell refused
to pay the commission on space sold to Mitsubishi and Hitachi. Ken sued
PennWell in a Texas court, alleging breach of contract, suit on sworn ac-
count, quantum meruit, and violations of the Texas Sales Representative
Act.2 19 The trial court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff on
claims for breach of contract, sworn account and attorney's fees and judg-
ment interest, and summary judgment to defendant on the other claims.
Both parties appealed, with defendant arguing that Japanese law con-
trolled and prohibited the sworn account judgment, the attorney's fees
and judgment interest. Plaintiff cross-appealed for the treble damages
not awarded under the Texas Sales Representative Act. The court of ap-
peals affirmed in all respects, finding that the parties had adequately es-
tablished Japanese law regarding attorney's fees,220 but had not done so
as to other issues such as sworn account and judgment interest, thus trig-
gering a presumption that it was the same as Texas law, 221 that plaintiff's
sworn account claim was a procedural matter governed by forum law and
not subject to choice-of-law analysis,222 and that the trial court correctly
withheld treble damages under the Texas Sales Representatives Act be-
cause it did not apply to actions outside of Texas. 223
In Johnson v. Structured Asset Services, LLC, a court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's application of Texas law in an annuity interpleader
216. Id. at *2 (citing Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987)).
217. Id. at *5.
218. 123 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
219. Id. at 759, 769-70 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.81-.86 (Vernon 2002
& Supp. 2004)).
220. Id. at 761-62. The court of appeals found Japanese law applicable to the attorney's
fees claim without performing any choice of law analysis, apparently because the parties
conceded its applicability. Although the court of appeals found that the parties adequately
established Japanese law on the attorney's fees issues (and implicitly found it controlling),
the court did not accept the defendant's argument that Japanese law prohibited attorney
fees; the opinion is confusing on this point. From the Japanese law materials submitted to
the trial court, the court of appeals found that Japanese law allowed for attorney's fees
only in tort actions but all of the plaintiff's claims sounded in contract. Id. at 761-63.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 764.
223. Id. at 769.
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where the annuitant failed to request judicial notice of Pennsylvania
law.224 In an unreported case, a Texas court of appeals affirmed a trial
court's directed verdict in plaintiff's favor, overruling defendants' appeal
argument that the plaintiff was permitted to use expert testimony as to
Mexican law regarding its statute of limitation. Specifically, defendants
appealed the finding that plaintiff failed to follow Texas Rule of Evidence
203 regarding notice and proof of foreign law. The court of appeals
agreed that the record did not reflect compliance with Rule 203, but it
further held that the defendants failed to show any prejudice because
they failed to show that Mexico's law in fact differed from that asserted at
trial.225
4. Use of the Forum's Procedural Rules
In re Union Carbide is an unreported opinion in which defendant
Union Carbide inadvertently produced privileged documents during dis-
covery in California.226 The defendant obtained a protective order from
a California court barring the use of the privileged documents. The Texas
trial court, however, ruled that California law did not apply and that
under Texas law, Union Carbide waived its claim of privilege. 227 The
court of appeals reversed, finding a false conflict between Texas and Cali-
fornia law, but first noting the applicability of Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws section 139 regarding privilege and the Texas court hold-
ings that "the state where the communication took place is the state with




In PennWell, discussed above, the court of appeals affirmed a trial
court's characterization of the plaintiff's claim for sworn account regard-
ing the leasing of convention space in Japan as a procedural matter gov-
erned by Texas law rather than an issue subject to choice of law. 229 In an
unreported case, a Texas federal court applied the Texas limitations rule
rather than California's, deeming the matter one of procedure.
230
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include those from
224. 148 S.W.3d 711, 720 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
225. Thomas v. Arrendadora Internacional, S.A. de C.V., No. 13-02-154-CV, 2004 WL
1900821, *3-4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 26, 2004, no pet. h.).
226. In re Union Carbide, No. 01-02-01153-CV, 2003 WL 22682301 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Nov. 13, 2003, no pet.).
227. Id. at *1. Specifically, the trial court found waiver in Union Carbide's failure to
comply with the ten-day requirement to amend their response under TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3
(Vernon 2004).
228. Id. at *34 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995)).
229. PennWell, 123 S.W.3d at 764. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
230. Woolley v. Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells, L.L.P., No. Civ. A. 3:01-CV-2185,
2004 WL 57215, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2004) (citing Baker and Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R &
D, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 1999)).
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sister-states and foreign country judgments, but they do not include fed-
eral court judgments from districts outside Texas because those judg-
ments are enforced as local federal court judgments. 231
A. ENFORCEMENT
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the
common law method using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local
lawsuit,232 and since 1981, the more direct procedure under the two uni-
form judgments Acts, along with similar acts for arbitration awards, child
custody and child support. There were no instances of common law en-
forcement during the Survey period. 233
1. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA") pro-
vides for summary enforcement of non-Texas judgments that are entitled
to full faith and credit.234 This includes sister-state judgments as well as
foreign country money judgments that Texas recognizes under the Uni-
form Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act ("UFCM-
JRA").235 The Survey period produced five UEFJA cases and two
231. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
232. The underlying mandate for the common law enforcement is the full-faith-and-
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004). The Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA") specifically reserves the common law method as an
alternative. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1997).
233. Examples of common law enforcement after the UEFJA's enactment include Kel-
ler v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1985); Escalona v. Combs, 712 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse & Transfer Co., 687
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); McFadden v. Farmers and
Merchs. Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
234. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.007 (Vernon 1997). The Act re-
quires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenticated under federal
or Texas law, id. § 35.003; (2) notice to the judgment debtor from the clerk, id. § 35.004, or
the judgment creditor, id. § 35.005. The judgment debtor may (1) move to stay enforce-
ment if grounds exist under the law of Texas or the rendering state, id. § 35.006, and (2)
challenge enforcement along traditional full faith and credit grounds such as the rendering
state's lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 35.003.
235. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001-.008 (Vernon 1997). Like the
UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor to file a copy of the foreign coun-
try judgment that has been authenticated under federal or Texas law, id. § 36.0041, with
notice to the debtor provided either by the clerk, id. § 36.0042(b), or the creditor, id.§ 36.0043(a). The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, or sixty if
domiciled in a foreign country, with a twenty-day extension available for good cause. Id.
§ 36.0044(a). Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten grounds for non-
recognition-three mandatory and seven discretionary. Briefly stated, the mandatory
grounds are (1) lack of an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 36.005(a)(1)-(3). The discretionary grounds for non-
recognition are that the foreign action (1) involved inadequate notice, (2) was obtained by
fraud, (3) violates Texas public policy, (4) is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is
contrary to the parties' agreement (e.g., a contrary forum selection clause), (6) was in an
inconvenient forum, and (7) is not from a country granting reciprocal enforcement rights.
Id. § 36.005(b)(1)-(7). The UFCMJRA also provides for stays, id. § 36.007, and expressly





The Survey period included five interstate judgment enforcements,
only two of which were reported, both from Georgia and both decided by
the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals. The more significant
of the two, Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc. ,236 illus-
trates several important features regarding foreign judgment enforce-
ment, including the proper vehicle for appellate review of a vacated
sister-state judgment and the proper standard of review. In 1996, Geor-
gia-based Mindis bought oilfield machinery from three Texas companies
("the defendants"). Mindis later claimed the machinery was defective
and sued for contract and warranty remedies in a Georgia court. Two of
the Texas companies filed for bankruptcy and there was some confusion
regarding which attorneys represented the remaining Texas defendant,
Oilfield Motor & Control. Mindis eventually obtained a final judgment
against Oilfield for $116,653.88 and then domesticated the judgment in
Texas. Oilfield filed a motion to vacate that the Texas trial court granted
without stating a reason. Mindis filed both a writ of mandamus and an
appeal.2 37
The court of appeals first noted that appeal is the proper method for
reviewing the vacating of a foreign judgment. 238 In addressing the va-
cated judgment, the court noted that a motion to vacate is viewed as a
motion for new trial, but that because of the Constitution's full faith and
credit mandate for foreign judgments, the trial judge did not have com-
plete discretion to grant a new trial.239 The motion for new trial standard
did mean, however, that the trial court's action would be reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.2 40 Applying that standard, the court
found that Oilfield's three arguments were groundless: the Georgia judg-
ment was not interlocutory, 241 it was not subject to modification in Geor-
gia in a way that defeated finality,242 and it was not procured by extrinsic
fraud. 243
In Charles Brown, L.L.P. v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc.,244 Lanier sought
enforcement of its Georgia arbitration award confirmed by a Georgia
court against a Texas-based law firm. Brown L.L.P. entered into an
agreement with Lanier for an office copy machine, and the agreement
had an arbitration clause designating Altanta, Georgia as the arbitration
standards, id. § 36.008. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1895) (comity as discre-
tionary grounds for recognizing and enforcing foreign country judgments).
236. 132 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
237. Id. at 481-82.
238. Id. at 482-84.
239. Id. at 484-85.
240. Id. at 485-86.
241. Id. at 486-87.
242. Id. at 488-90.
243. Id. at 490.
244. 124 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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location. 245 When Brown and Lanier fell into a dispute regarding the
copy machine, Brown filed a preemptive lawsuit in a county court at law
in Harris County seeking an injunction against the arbitration in Georgia,
arguing that he had never signed the document containing the arbitration
clause; the Houston court denied the injunction and ordered Brown to
arbitrate in Georgia. 246 Brown then filed a similar lawsuit in state district
court in Harris County and met the same outcome.2 47 Brown then ap-
peared under protest, arguing that his firm was misidentified in the arbi-
tration notice. These arguments failed as well and Brown was ordered to
pay $29,639.18 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.2 48 Brown
then returned to Harris County District Court and sought to vacate the
award. Before Brown's claim could be heard, a Georgia court confirmed
by Lanier's award; Lanier then sought enforcement in the same Texas
court where Brown's claim was pending. The Texas trial court entered
summary judgment for Lanier, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding
that the misnomers were resolved by Brown's judicial admissions and
waiver, and that Brown was subject to Georgia jurisdiction because of the
forum clause, 249 and that no other reasons existed to deny full faith and
credit to the Georgia court judgment.250,
An unreported case raised an important issue regarding punitive dam-
ages as grounds for rejecting a foreign judgment. Wayne Kraft obtained a
default judgment against Reatta Resources in an Illinois state court,
awarding $6,000 in actual damages and attorney's fees and $200,000 in
punitive damages. 251 When Kraft domesticated the Illinois judgment in
Texas, Reatta appealed on the grounds that the punitive damages ratio of
thirty-three to one violated due process under the Supreme Court's re-
cent analysis of punitive damages.2 52 The Fifth District Court of Appeals
in Dallas rejected this challenge, finding that in its tacit approval of sin-
gle-digit multipliers for the ratio of punitive-to-actual damages, the Su-
preme Court did not create a bright-line test that would overcome the full
faith and credit mandate. As such, there was no error on the face of the
record and no grounds to deny enforcement. 253 This is no doubt an accu-
rate reading of an important constitutional clash between due process
and full faith and credit. Attorneys are thereby cautioned to challenge
shortfalls-even due process shortfalls-in the initial forum because full
faith and credit will almost certainly bar that challenge later, except as to
jurisdictional problems in default judgments.
245. Id. at 888-89.
246. Id. at 889.
247. Id. at 889-90.
248. Id. at 890.
249. Id. at 892, 900-01.
250. Id. at 902-06.
251. Reatta Res., Inc. v. Kraft, No. 05-03-00229-CV, 2004 WL 423144 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las Mar. 9, 2004, no pet. h.).




Tracy v. Top Drawer Medical Art, Inc. 254 echoes the issues raised in
Mindis. Top Drawer sued Todd Tracey in a Wisconsin state court for
breach of contract. Tracey answered and objected to jurisdiction but later
defaulted. Top Drawer domesticated the judgment in Texas and Tracey
again raised objections as to lack of jurisdiction. The trial court failed to
act within the appropriate seventy-five days of the court's plenary juris-
diction, but nonetheless granted Tracey's request and refused enforce-
ment. Top Drawer filed a motion to reconsider on the grounds that the
court lost jurisdiction, which the court granted and reinstated enforce-
ment. Tracey appealed on grounds that treating his jurisdictional objec-
tion as a motion for new trial, when he was not seeking a new trial but
merely to vacate the Wisconsin judgment, was a violation of due pro-
cess.255 The court of appeals rejected his arguments and found that the
remedies available in a motion for new trial were adequate for his juris-
dictional challenge to the Wisconsin judgment, and he failed to resolve
the matter heard within the proper time.
25 6
Mathis v. Nathanson257 made another important judgment-enforce-
ment point regarding offsets. Mathis lost an arbitration in Colorado that
was then converted into a judgment for $75,450.38. When judgment cred-
itor Nathanson domesticated the Colorado judgment in Texas, Mathis
sought to stay enforcement based on an unadjudicated offset. The trial
court refused; Mathis appealed and lost.
258
b. Foreign Country Money Judgments
The Survey period produced four foreign-country-money-judgment en-
forcements, all involving insurance claims. In Society of Lloyd's v. Co-
hen, the Fifth Circuit rejected the judgment-debtor's personal jurisdiction
challenge to a British judgment, finding that he had submitted to En-
gland's jurisdiction when he became an underwriter for Lloyd's, and that
he had received adequate notice of the suit.259 In Society of Lloyd's v.
Anderson, a Dallas federal district court enforced a British judgment over
objections that the statute of limitations had run (must be litigated in the
first forum), due process (British process was sufficient), and fraud (but it
was not fraud in the judicial proceeding and thus not a defense here).260
Society of Lloyd's v. Price considered the status of British judgment credi-
tors against the Texas debtor's bankruptcy assets, specifically whether
under the UFCMJRA the British judgment provided immediate creditor
status (regarding to bankruptcy priority, or whether the status did not
254. Tracy v. Top Drawer Medical Art, Inc., No. 08-02-00273-CV, 2003 WL 22361477
(Tex. App.-E1 Paso Oct. 16, 2003, no pet.).
255. Id. at *1.
256. Id. at *24.
257. Mathis v. Nathanson, No. 03-03-00123-CV, 2004 WL 162965 (Tex. App.-Austin
2004, pet. denied).
258. Id. at *1-3.
259. 108 Fed. Appx. 126 (5th Cir. 2004).




vest until the British judgments were domesticated in Texas. 261 The court
held that creditor status occurred upon rendition in England but re-
manded the case to the bankruptcy court for further findings regarding
dates of asset transfers.2 62 In Society of Lloyd's v. Abramson, a Dallas
federal court overruled the judgment debtor's objections that the English
judgment was obtained by fraud; the court found inadequate evidence of
fraud and that it had no offset on the amount owed.
263
2. Judgments Against Sovereigns
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") 264 regulates judg-
ment enforcement against the assets of sovereign governments. In Af-
Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo,265 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
visited a long-litigated claim arising from a 1984 road-construction loan to
the Republic of Congo. It defaulted in 1985, leading to a default judg-
ment for $13,628,340.11 in a British court, which was domesticated in a
New York state court for the attachment of any oil and gas proceeds in
New York. Debt remained after that action and in 2001, the creditor reg-
istered the New York judgment in a Texas state court and sought to gar-
nish the assets of various businesses owned by the debtor government, all
collectively referred to as "the Congo defendants.
266
The Congo defendants removed the action to federal court and moved
to dismiss on the grounds that all defendant-owned assets in Texas were
immune from execution pursuant to the FSIA; the creditor argued that
the Republic of Congo had waived the defendants immunity in the loan
contract and that this was adjudicated in the New York action.267 The
federal district court dismissed. On appeal the Fifth Circuit agreed that
the New York ruling on execution was not preclusive in this action and
held that the district court applied the wrong asset-immunity test under
the FSIA. Specifically, the appellate court ruled that immunity waivers
apply only " 'against property that meets . . . two statutory criteria,'
namely, that the property in question be 'in the United States' and 'used
for commercial activities in the United States." 268 The court also found
error in the district court's focus on how the Texas assets were generated
instead of how they were used.269 On remand, the district court re-evalu-
ated the Congo defendants' Texas assets and again found them exempt
under federal law. 270 The creditor again appealed, and this time the Fifth
261. In re Price, No. SA-03-CA-0883, 2004 WL 2550590, *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2004).
262. Id. at *6.
263. Society of Lloyd's v. Abramson, No. 3-3MC001-P, 2004 WL 690878, *4-6 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 29, 2004).
264. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-11 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
265. 383 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
266. Id. at 364-65.
267. Id. at 365.
268. Id. (quoting Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 247
(5th Cir. 2002)).
269. Id. at 365 n.3 (quoting Conn. Bank, 309 F.3d at 251).
270. Id. at 366.
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Circuit resolved the matter, reversing the district court and finding that
the assets were primarily used for a commercial purpose in the United
States and thus subject to garnishment.271
3. Arbitration Enforcement
Foreign arbitration awards may be enforced in Texas under federal and
state law.272
The most notable case during the Survey period involved the vacating
of an international arbitration award during its enforcement in a Texas
federal court. Karaha Bodas LLC is a Cayman Islands company that had
contracted to build and operate a geothermal power plant in Indone-
sia.273 When the Indonesian government suspended the project and
failed to pay, Karaha Bodas obtained an arbitral award that it filed in a
Texas federal court, seeking enforcement under the so-called New York
Convention. 274 The district court ordered enforcement but during the ap-
peal, Indonesia obtained an order from an Indonesian court nullifying the
arbitral award. On remand from the first appeal, the district court denied
effect to the Indonesian court order and held that Swiss law rather than
Indonesian law governed the award, pursuant to the arbitral panel's ear-
lier decision, based on the site of arbitration.275 Under Swiss law, the
district court found the award to be proper and again ordered enforce-
ment. Indonesia appealed again, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed.276
4. Family Law Judgments
Texas laws also provide for recognition and enforcement of sister-state
and foreign country child custody under the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") 277 and child support under the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"). 278 These cases often
overlap with jurisdictional issues and are discussed in the jurisdiction
section.279
271. Id. at 366-73.
272. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); Texas
International Arbitration Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 172.082(f) (Vernon 1997
& Supp. 2004).
273. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2004).
274. Id. at 281 (citing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2157, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered
into force in the United States, Dec. 29, 1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 et seq. (West
1999 & Supp. 2004)).
275. Id. at 285-87.
276. Id. at 287-310. See also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
277. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.317 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
278. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159. 001-.902 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).




Both sister-state and foreign country judgments are entitled to preclu-
sive effect in Texas courts. The full-faith-and-credit clause compels full
faith and credit for valid and final sister-state judgments involving the
same parties and claims, as well as collateral estoppel if the required ele-
ments are satisfied. 280 Under the doctrine of comity, foreign country
judgments may also be given res judicata and preclusive effect, subject to
discretion based on the nature of the foreign proceeding and satisfaction
of traditional preclusion requirements. 281
1. Interstate Preclusion
In a case turning more on federalism than interstate conflicts, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a consumer class action regarding de-
fective polybutylene plumbing pipes, based on the preclusive effect of an
earlier Tennessee state court class action.282 To avoid preclusion, the
plaintiff asserted a civil rights claim, based on alleged due process viola-
tions in the Tennessee settlement. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's holding that this new claim was a collateral attack on the Tennes-
see state court settlement, from which federal courts are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.283 The court noted that Rooker-Feldman ap-
plied only if the state court judgment was entitled to preclusion, that is, it
was valid and final under the law of the rendering state. 28
4
A Houston Court of Appeals used the preclusion doctrine to reverse
the trial court's anti-suit injunction.285 The parties were involved in par-
allel lawsuits in Texas and Pennsylvania regarding failed aircraft crank-
shafts. The Texas trial court enjoined defendants from pursuing the
Pennsylvania case, persuaded by plaintiff's argument that its interests
were being litigated in absentia. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning
that "either (1) the Pennsylvania lawsuit cannot affect ISW's interests, or
(2) ISW's interests are represented in the Pennsylvania lawsuits by a
party in privity with it."'286
The El Paso Court of Appeals denied an Arizona court's rejection of a
Texas case. Access Healthsource obtained a $10 million judgment against
280. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 701-02; see also 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
281. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 20, at 999-1001.
282. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 347-48, 350, 354
(5th Cir. 2003). A federal district court in Houston considered similar issues in an Enron
dispute involving a prior Texas state court judgment and related claims in federal court.
See AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. Civ. A-03-4973, 2004
WL 2278770 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2004).
283. Richard, 355 F.3d at 350-52 (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)).
284. Id. at 350-51 (citing In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 200 F.3d 317, 319 n.1, 320 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
285. AVCO Corp. v. Interstate Southwest, Ltd., 145 S.W.3d 257, 263-64 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
286. Id. at 263.
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Ross in an El Paso court and then sought enforcement in Arizona, where
Ross was able to block enforcement on the grounds of improper ser-
vice. 287 When Access sought Texas enforcement, Ross argued that the
Arizona court's finding should be preclusive of the Texas judgment's in-
validity. The Texas trial court disagreed and the court of appeals af-
firmed, finding that the Arizona decision had done nothing more than
vacate the domestication in Arizona.2 88
2. International Preclusion
In International Transactions Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regi-
omontana, S.A. de C.V.,289 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a
Mexican bankruptcy court's ruling that the Texas plaintiff lacked standing
to collect on an arbitration award against the defendant. Plaintiff ITL
loaned money to Embotelladora and other companies who intended to
build a Pepsi-Cola bottling plant in Monterrey, Mexico. ITL was acting
through an undisclosed agent, Sharp Capital, and when the defendant
companies defaulted on the loan, ITL instructed Sharp to take the matter
to arbitration in Texas. Sharp did so and won $11,374,859. The arbitra-
tion award named Sharp, who then assigned it to ITL, and ITL then sued
in a Texas state court to confirm and enforce the award. Embotelladora
and the other defendant companies removed the Texas suit to federal
court and argued that by not being named in the award, ITL lacked
standing to collect it. In support, defendants offered an ex parte order
they obtained from a Mexican bankruptcy court holding that ITL was not
entitled to enforce the award against defendants' assets.290 Under the
doctrine of comity, the federal district court recognized the Mexican
bankruptcy court order.291 The Fifth Circuit reversed, based on the Mex-
ican court order's ex parte nature. 292 Judge Smith dissented, arguing that
the Mexican bankruptcy order was entitled to recognition in Texas be-
cause ITL knew of the proceeding and declined to participate. 293
The opposite result was reached in Gulf Petro Trading Co., Inc. v.
Nigerian National Petroleum Corp., where a federal district court applied
comity to uphold a Swiss decision disallowing an earlier arbitration award
arising from a joint venture in Nigeria. 294
287. Ross v. Access Healthsource, Inc., No. 08-03-00079-CV, 2003 WL 22870451 (Tex.
App.-EI Paso Dec. 4, 2003, pet. denied).
288. Id. at *24.
289. 347 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2003).
290. Id. at 590-92.
291. Id. at 593.
292. Id. at 593-96.
293. Id. at 596-98.
294. 288 F. Supp. 2d 783, 785-86, 795 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
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